AUTHOR:
Yonah Alexander and Milton Hoenig
SOURCE:
Super Terrorism: Biological, Chemical, and Nuclear, by Yonah
Alexander and Milton Hoenig, Editors. Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2001
TEXT:
Terrorism may be defined as the calculated employment or threat of violence by individuals, sub-national, and state actors to attain political, social, and economic objectives in violation of law, intended to create an overwhelming fear in a target area larger than the victims attacked or threatened. It constitutes a permanent fixture of contemporary life.
The bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City in 1993 and the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 underscores this reality. These incidents took the lives of many people. We foresee the possibility of even worse times ahead because we may be moving into a new “age of super-terrorism” with very real prospects for the use of weapons of mass destruction. Such a prospect has frightening consequences for the survival of civilization, as we know it.
It is likely that terrorism will continue to plague the world in the future as it did in the era of superpower rivalry. What raises the stakes of terrorism in the “new world order” is the threat that the coming years may witness more actors (nations, organizations, and individuals) with the intent and capability to use weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical, and nuclear), and greater availability of the knowledge and technology needed to manufacture and deliver such weapons.
Improved weapons technology gives terrorists advantages that they lacked in earlier times. For example, a person could, in principle, carry in his pocket enough chemical agents to kill many people in the World Trade Center in New York City. The packet of deadly material would be so small that even a security official inspecting visitors to the building would not be able to spot a bulge in the terrorist’s pocket.
This terrorist could introduce the chemical agents into the air circulation system of the building. By the time people inside the building developed symptoms indicating illness, it would be too late to do anything to save them. Such an attack could easily take a toll of hundreds of lives.
This is but one example of the danger of technology in the hands of terrorists,
and there are many examples involving biological, chemical, and nuclear materials
or weapons. The events in Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center suggest that
the same mind-set that allowed men to use a bomb against innocent civilians
could be directed to even more spectacular and largescale violence. Governments
would be unwise to ignore the possibility that a terrorist organization will
raise the stakes of violence to unprecedented new
heights of awareness.
The bombings in Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center suggest that the United States is much more vulnerable to terrorism than ever before. Domestic groups with an anti-government agenda and foreign agents that see the United States as a supreme enemy can take advantage of the many targets symbolizing the United States to cause cataclysmic damage in the United States on a scale that the country has never before experienced.
Biological And Chemical Issues
When the chemical agent Sarin was released in a Tokyo subway in March 1995, world attention turned to the dangers of chemical terrorism. The casualty rate was high enough, but some observers claimed that if the chemical concentration had been higher, the number of deaths could have been in the hundreds.
What is particularly significant about the Tokyo incident is that it demonstrated
that chemical terrorism is a danger to states from non-state organizations.
This incident was undertaken by Aum Shinrikyo, a private religious organization.
If the practice of using chemical agents to kill people becomes a pattern for
non-state actors, the danger of biological and chemical attack can come from
a variety of sources, including scientists with advanced doctoral degrees in
chemistry, who are experts in narrow aspects of biology and
chemistry relevant to the goals of groups intent on killing people.
Ever since the 1995 attack scholars have discussed some basic questions: To what extent is Tokyo a singular event or a harbinger of things to come? Has this incident broken whatever taboo existed with respect to terrorist use of these kinds of materials, or is this group an anomaly?
Some experts have argued that the kinds of self-imposed restraints in terrorist
use of these materials that existed in the past will continue for the same reasons
that have been traditionally important. In the international community, which
in the past has successfully imposed constraints upon the use
of such weapons.
From the perspective of the United States, this view seems to be dominant. Most Americans seems not to have become alarmed about a Tokyo-type attack in the United States. They have not endorsed big programs to defend the American public against such attacks.
Other observers maintain that we have crossed the threshold into a new era in which we will see more super-terrorism in a sustained systematic manner, in the same way we saw skyjackings in the late 1960’s and 1970’s. Only time will tell which view is correct.
Biological and chemical terrorism may pose greater dangers to civilized society than nuclear terrorism. With nuclear materials, governments have more security and safeguards arrangements for materials and weapons than are possible for biological and chemical items that can be turned into products for creating death and destruction.
In a free society, such as the United States, it is impossible to control those
non-nuclear materials or the groups that might be interested in them so rigorously
that we make ourselves invulnerable to a terrorist incident. The problem of
security against terrorism has increased as a result of a changing
world economic structure.
A consequence of developing a global economy is the placement of non-military facilities in many different countries. For example, pharmaceutical plants, which can produce ingredients used to create explosions in the manner of Oklahoma City, are emerging in developed and developing nations.
As more companies build facilities in places where international control regimes are weak, there is an increased risk of biological and chemical terrorism. In many developing countries, government officials do not have the same attitude toward public safety as exists in advanced industrial societies. Totalitarian countries clearly do not even regard the rule of law in the same way that industrial nations do. Therefore, as the world moves forward economically, the normal processes of development are going to expand to such an extent that industrial facilities will produce enticing items for use by terrorists.
The potential for an enormous disaster is significant. Antiterrorist efforts must be strengthened to the degree that all nations adopt the kind of attitude that the military shows in the handling of certain types of weapons and on its vessels: namely, zero tolerance for safety violations. If super-terrorism is to be thwarted, a safety culture must be the responsibility of everyone involved, from the person in the boardroom to the person who drives the pickup truck. Safety is a cultural issue that must be imposed on these companies.
Creating a safety culture is easier said than done. In the United States, we
used to have fire drills in peacetime and air raid drills in wartime. We had
all sorts of things to sensitize people to safety matters. We need to sensitize
people from a very early age that safety is everybody’s business if we are to
begin to control the elements of biological and chemical terrorism that terrorists
find inviting. We also need to enforce the Chemical Weapons Convention and complete
a protocol that includes inspections under the Biological Weapons Convention.
Even with the best of safety precautions, however, the availability of biological and chemical weapons is widespread. It does not take much skill to use biological and chemical weapons for terrorist purposes. Simple kinds of bacteriological and chemical materials can be made in sufficient quantities to kill large numbers of people.
The types of materials that can be dangerous include items used in the manufacture of products ranging from paint to ball-point pens. Some materials are components in flame-retardant products. All of these have chemicals that could be used in a chemical attack. In addition, chemicals and biological cultures that are shared on a daily basis by the medical community around the world are exactly the types of materials that are attractive for use in biological weapons.
Nuclear Issues
While biological and chemical weapons in the short term are technologically
feasible, in the long term, nuclear terrorism—the explosion of a nuclear bomb,
the use of fissionable material as a radioactive poison, or the seizure and
sabotage of nuclear facilities—is plausible and perhaps inevitable. Nuclear
materials for commercial purposes will increasingly be shipped by land, sea,
and air. The possibility of hijacking shipments of such material and using it
to build nuclear weapons or radiological devices is no longer just
the subject of movie thrillers but remains a real prospect for terrorists.
Fears of such dangers were expressed in connection with Japan’s shipment of plutonium on the high seas in 1992. But more realistic fears were felt after the break-up of the Soviet Union and the weakening security of existing nuclear storage facilities in the newly independent republics.
It may be possible for a group of terrorists to build a crude nuclear weapon if they possess the essential expertise as well as the materials and components. A terrorist group could also steal a weapon from the thousands stored in nuclear weapon states. However, such a group would find it difficult to construct a sophisticated nuclear weapon without state sponsorship because of requirements for testing and securing safe havens. Terrorists could also seize medical isotopes from hospitals or radioactive wastes from commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing plants.
In sum, all of these factors indicate that terrorists might find these tactics particularly desirable for future operations. Such a prospect highlights the need for both thorough analysis and strong preventive measures to avert the threat of such seizure and attacks.
Policy Issues
Clearly, there are a number of public policy issues that need to be studied. One concern involved: To what extent does the government want to intensify awareness of the danger of super-terrorism? There are arguments for and against sensitizing the public. To some degree, people do not want to think about the subject of super-terrorism. Further, highlighting the danger of super-terrorism can breed a lack of confidence in government if the public senses that there is a danger that government may not be able to deal with the threat.
Failure to respond adequately to crises poses dangers to government. For example,
Chernobyl, which placed a very heavy responsibility on the officials responding
to the nuclear incident, produced a direct erosion of authority of the Soviet
government. In the United States, Hurricane Andrew and the failure of the federal
government to respond adequately had direct negative political consequences
for President George Bush. Considering the biological and chemical issue, the
government would have to respond even if
ill prepared to deal with a cataclysmic event. An inadequate response would
damage its authority.
Some experts contend that there should be no reticence in discussing these types of issues. An expert group should be able to explain the tradeoffs. Government must tell the people of the world what they are facing and identify the threat.
Then there is the issue of the amount of publicity that government should give to this subject. Will increased warnings about super-terrorism produce a self-fulfilling prophecy as terrorists direct their attention to even greater devastating acts?
There are also concerns about the international implications of biological and chemical terrorism. How should be United States work with foreign nations in meeting the challenge of super-terrorism?
Clearly, there is a tremendous need to educate the government agencies that will serve as front-line operators and first-line responders to an act of super-terrorism. Preparation for a disaster is complicated, however. Better equipment is needed to deal with such a cataclysmic event of super-terrorism. To take the necessary precautions, such as stockpiling vaccines, costs money. The FBI and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has been tasked to play a key role in such an emergency. Many other agencies must be involved.
More funding is needed for research and development. It was only about 30 years
ago that the development of technological capabilities to deal with natural
disasters began to receive support. We need much more research and development
in this area than we are currently supporting. Specifically, there
should be more of a focus on the decontamination of urban areas.
Another major issue of public policy involves the conflict between national security and civil liberties—a persistent issue in the United States during the Cold War. Will increased wiretaps and increased surveillance produce greater security? How much and what kind of tradeoffs must be made?
One issue of public policy involves the political resolve to take steps against foreign enemies who are exporting terrorism. It was noted that the desire and effort to carry through on a consistent policy from the top has been lacking for decades. A good example is the attempt to enact sanctions on those countries that deal with Iran and do business with the United States. There has been no real desire to impose tough and consistent restrictions in the so-called sanctions that the United States employs against Iran.
Another concern centered on the best way to publicize the prospect of super-terrorism. Some observers argue that the discussion should be conducted mostly within the government and one should not debate contingency plans, for indeed, they may generate a self-fulfilling prophecy. What is lacking in the use of intelligence that does exist, classified and unclassified, resulting in decisive action. On the basis of information supplied by government agencies in cases of clear and present danger, the President and no one else should go before the nation and explain the situation. When that happens, public opinion coalesces around the President and national action results.
The aforementioned issues are some of the considerations addressed in this volume. There are many other aspects related both to the threat and responses to super-terrorism that are discussed by politicians, members of Congress, and leading experts. By presenting these deliberations we attempted to lay out a roadmap for understanding American views on this growing challenge to national and international security.
Acknowledgements
To be sure, this volume represents another research effort in this important field of public concern that was formally initiated over a dozen years ago at the Terrorism Studies Program of The George Washington University. Numerous seminars and conferences dealing with different aspects of the challenges were organized.
We wish to acknowledge in particular the support of the Smith Richardson Foundation for a related research project on “Counter Terrorism Strategies for the 21st Century: National, Regional, and Global Agenda,” which resulted in the publication of Volumes 15-23, Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1999-2001), edited by Yonah Alexander and Donald J. Musch as well as the four-volume set on Cyber Terrorism and Information Warfare: Threats and Reponses (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 2000), edited by Yonah Alexander and Michael S. Swetnam. Thanks are also due to the Stella and Charles Guttman Foundation, Inc., for their assistance in the publication of a four-volume set on Legal Aspects of Terrorism in the United States (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 2000), edited by Yonah Alexander and Edgar H. Brenner.
Special gratitude goes to Professor Yuval Ne’eman of Tel Aviv University for his wise guidance, and to Timothy F. Wuliger for his continuing support of the multidisciplinary project on “Preventing Super-Terrorism: Biological, Chemical, and Nuclear Terrorism.”
Finally, we wish to thank Michael S. Swetnam, president and chairman of the board, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, for his continuing encouragement and support. We also wish to thank Herbert M. Levine, James T. Kirkhope, Allyson Kozal, Alon Lanir, Peter H. Leddy, Brian M. Miller, and Vivek Narayanan at the International Center for Terrorism Studies, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies, International Law Institute for their research role.
Yonah Alexander
and
Milton M. Hoenig
Washington, D.C.
May 15, 2001
PROMOTION:
This article has been extracted from Super Terrorism: Biological, Chemical,
and Nuclear, by Yonah Alexander and Milton Hoenig, Editors. Transnational
Publishers, Inc., 2001.
The complete book, in print or e-book format, can be purchased from TerrorismBooks.com and is also available online through your TerrorismCentral Reference Library subscription.
PUBLICATION TYPE:
Book Article
COPYRIGHT:
Copyright © 2001 by Transnational Publishers, Inc.