Mantiqi I: Malaysia (except Sarawak and Sabah), Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia

M1 is the oldest organization within JI, covering Malaysia, Singapore, and Southern Thailand. It was organized and managed by Hambali until mid-2002 when control passed to Ali Gufron, alias Mukhlas, after Hambali was forced to go into hiding by the Singapore Internal Security Division (ISD) disruption of Operation JIBRIL. Thanks to the ISD's efforts, M1's organizational structure is the best known of all the elements.

Malaysian Branch

The Malaysian branch of M1 is the largest formation within JI and has an estimated 200 members. [41] Faiz Bafana ran the branch until his arrest in 2002. Since that time, it is possible that Bafana's second in command, Abu Hanafiah, has assumed control. The branch sub-divided Malaysia into six wakalah covering the country and was responsible for the oversight of the Singapore wakalah as well. The Malaysian wakalah operate out of Kuala Lumpur, Johor, Kuantan, Perak, Kelantan, and Negri Sembilan. [42] Five primary functions have been identified and associated with the Malaysian branch: initial indoctrination and training of new personnel, coordination of jihad activities for the Maluku region, establishment and management of front companies, procurement of weapons and bomb making material, and liaison with its legal affiliate, Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM). [43]

Training and indoctrination was carried out at a JI facility in Negri Sembilan. Located in southern Malaysia, the facility was used to provide initial indoctrination for JI recruits before they would be sent on for military training at Al-Qaida-run camps in Afghanistan. [44] New recruits would receive letters from a Pakistani madrasa stating that they were attending religious training in Pakistan. The trainees would then go to Negri Sembilan for initial physical training and introduction into JI ideology before heading to Pakistan to infiltrate across the Afghan border to the Al-Qaida camps.

Abu Jibril coordinated jihad activities for the JI. Jibril, known for his fiery rhetoric, was a passionate recruiter for jihad in Maluku and Ambon. Haji Ibrahim bin Haji Maidin, the qoiad wakalah in Singapore during Operation JIBRIL, was an early recruit of Jibril. [45] Aside from recruiting personnel, he also organized weapons shipments from Thailand and transport for mujahidin into the zones of conflict. He participated in the fighting in Ambon with Laskar Mujahidin and was known to have recruited personnel for other JI operations. [46]

To support operations, the Malaysian branch owned and operated at least four front companies in the country. Konsojaya was a palm oil export company set up by Hambali, ostensibly to export oil to Afghanistan. [47] Hambali utilized this company in 1993 to channel escape money to Ramzi Yousef and Wali Khan in the Philippines after the World Trade Center bombing. In 1994, he transferred Konsojaya funds to support the start-up of Operation BOJINKA. Though Hambali was involved with the start-up of Konsojaya, he relied on another JI operative for the operation of other front companies. Yazid Sufaat, a biochemist and former Malaysian military officer, was responsible for the establishment and management of JI Malaysia's other front companies. Between 1993 and 1996, Sufaat established Green Valley Medicine, Infocus Technology, and Secure Valley. [48] Green Valley Medicine was the front used to purchase and store ammonium nitrate earmarked for the vehicular bombs in Operation JIBRIL. [49] Through Infocus Technology, Sufaat provided support for the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. Among the documents seized during the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui was a letter signed by Sufaat stating that Moussaoui was an Infocus Technology marketing representative for the United States. In addition to the letter, Sufaat also provided Moussaoui with US$ 35,000 upfront and an additional US$ 2,500 a month while he was in the United States. [50] Sufaat's activities in support of JI operations ended in December 2001, when he was arrested by Malaysian authorities on his way back from Afghanistan. The Malaysian security forces identified Sufaat through his role in Operation JIBRIL.

Singapore Branch

Until his arrest in December 2001, the wakalah in Singapore was led by a local condominium manager named Haji Ibrahim bin Haji Maidin. [51] He had received military instruction in 1993 through the Al-Qaida mujahidin training program in Afghanistan. [52] Maidin gradually shifted from being the operational leader to more of a spiritual leader, with operational control of the wakalah passing to Mas Selamat bin Kastari . [53] Kastari ran the Singapore wakalah operations on his own after Maidin's arrest by the Singapore ISD in December 2001. Indonesian authorities on the island of Bitan apprehended Kastari on 3 February 2003. [54]

At least seven Singapore JI members were known to have attended training facilities in Afghanistan. [55] As the founder of the Singapore JI wakalah, Maidin worked to instill a high degree of discipline and operational security awareness in his recruits. Before they were sent to Afghanistan for Al-Qaida training, each of the recruits passed through the Negri Sembilan camp. [56] At least two of the Singapore operatives, Fiah Musa members Mohammad Ellias and Mohammad Nazir, were nominated for specialized training in one of three areas: ambush and assassination operations, sniper operations, or field engineering (i.e., bomb-making). [57]

JI Singapore's three operational fiah were named Ayub, Musa, and Ismail. [58] Initially, these cells were established to provide logistical support for attacks carried out by specialists brought in from outside the country. Most of the cell members were educated, middle-class men who did not display any of the outward appearances of radical Islamists. About one-third of the 31 men detained by the ISD possessed above-average intelligence. [59] They were neither destitute nor disenfranchised members of society. All of them had received secular educations prior to falling in with Maidin's Wahhabi preaching. [60] The men did not attend the local mosques, preferring to gather for religious observances on their own. [61] This was primarily because the local mosques did not preach Wahhabism. By all appearances, the cell members were normal, everyday citizens; a chauffer, a printer, a dispatch driver, a contractor, an engineer, etc. [62] One of the members, Andrew Gerard, alias Riduan bin Abdullah, was a Roman Catholic of Indian origin who converted to Islam in 1988. [63] The seemingly normal outward appearance displayed by the majority of cell members allowed them to operate under the Singapore ISD's window of visibility and conduct surveillance for several years.

The first, and oldest, operational cell was called Fiah Ayub. Its leader was a 39-year-old printer named Mohammed Khalim Jaffar. Khalim was recruited into the JI after attending Maidin's religious classes in 1989 or 1990. Some of these classes entailed visits by Hambali and Abu Jibril. [64] The other two members of Fiah Ayub were Hashim bin Abas and Ja'afar bin Mistooki. Fiah Musa was led by the 29-year-old Mohammad Ellias, a manager and former lance corporal in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), and 27-year-old Mohammed Nazir bin Mohammed Uthman, a ship traffic assistant who had served in the Singapore Coastal Defense Force (SCDF). Also in this cell was Adnan bin Musa and Bafana's brother, Fathi bin Abu Bakar Bafana. Fiah Ismail was the newest addition to JI Singapore, having been formed after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. Its leader was Halim bin Hussain, a 42-year-old supervisor who had performed his national service with the Singapore constabulary. [65]

The Singapore wakalah was disrupted in December 2001 by the Singapore ISD because of its activities in support of Operation JIBRIL. Planning and targeting activities for Operation JIBRIL began as early as 1997. [66] The operation grew from a plan conceived by Khalim to attack U.S. personnel in Singapore into a target package with six distinct plans orchestrated by Hambali with the approval of Mohammad Atef and other high-ranking Al-Qaida members in Afghanistan. The most developed part of the operation involved multiple truck-bomb attacks, each bomb roughly equivalent to Timothy McVeigh's Oklahoma City truck bomb, against targets in Singapore, utilizing foreign suicide bombers brought in by Al-Qaida. [67]

Thailand Branch

The Thailand branch of M1 recently came into the spotlight with the arrest of Arifin bin Ali, alias John Wong Ah Hung, on 16 May 2003 and Maisuri Haji Abdulloh, his son Muyahi Haji Doloh, and Waemahadi Wae Dao on 10 June 2003. [68] The four were charged with plotting attacks on foreign embassies and tourist locations throughout Thailand. Arifin bin Ali was former trainer at Camp Abu Bakar in the Philippines and a member of the Singapore wakalah who fled the country for Thailand after the collapse of Operation JIBRIL. [69] Prior to his own arrest, Singapore qoaid wakalah Mas Selamat Kastari tasked Ali with organizing the Thailand wakalah and gathering the remnants of the Singapore group. Ali established himself at poh noh (Thai Islamic School) Islam Burana Tohno in Narathiwat, southern Thailand run by Maisuri Haji Abdulloh and set to coordinating attacks within the country. Maisuri Haji Abdulloh reportedly received military training at a facility in Libya sometime in the past. [70] Abdulloh brought his son Muyahi into the operations. The fourth man arrested by Thai authorities was Waemahadi, a doctor and drugstore owner. Waemahadi was a graduate of Azhase Islamic College in Egypt and had previously been affiliated with an unspecified international terrorist organization. Through his contacts with this unspecified organization, Waemahadi had received funding to construct a 12-bed hospital in Narathiwat. Authorities are still seeking a fifth cell member, Samam Waekaji. Under the direction of Ali, the Thailand JI group developed plans to execute car bomb attacks against the U.S, U.K, Australian, Israeli, and Singaporean embassies in Bangkok. The group also targets soft-targets heavily trafficked by westerners, including Khao San Street, Soi Nana, and the Sukumvit Market area in Bangkok. [71] Other unspecified targets were developed in Phuket and Pattaya, both major sites for western tourists. [72]

Cambodia Branch

The recent arrest of two Thais and an Egyptian by Cambodian authorities, along with the expulsion of 28 other foreigners who had been teaching at an Islamic school outside Phnom Penh, points to the expansion of JI interests into the Cambodian Muslim community. The Muslims in Cambodia belong to the Cham minority; descendants of the former kingdom of Champa on the south-central Vietnamese coast who fled to Cambodia due to 15^th Century Vietnamese expansionism. [73] The Cham converted to Islam shortly after their arrival in Cambodia, and have longstanding complaints about the treatment they have received at the hands of the Buddhist majority. [74]

Acting on information provided by U.S. authorities, Cambodian security officials arrested or expelled a group of Muslims working for the Umm al-Qura organization. This Saudi-funded organization operated a series of religious schools and oversaw aid programs directed at the Cham minority. The Egyptian-born director of the Umm al-Qura organization, Esam Muhammad Khidr Ali, along with two Thai nationals, Abdul Azi Haji Chiming and Muhammad Yalaludin Mading, were arrested on 27 May 2003 and charged with having links to JI. [75] Twenty-eight other teachers and their dependents in Cambodia, who were from Nigeria, Pakistan, the Sudan, Thailand, Yemen, and Egypt, were expelled from the country. [76] Cambodian authorities had apparently been tracking the activities of the Umm al-Qura mosque members for over a year. The May 2003 arrests were carried out to forestall any attempts that could be directed against an impending meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Phnom Penh on 18 June 2003.

The arrests of the Umm al-Qura members provided key information that lead to the apprehension of Hambali in Thailand. Hambali had apparently stayed in Phnom Penh at a cheap hotel near the Dubai Mosque in a Muslim district near Boeng Kak lake from September 2002 to March 2003. [77] He had entered Cambodia through the town of Koh Kong on the coast of the Gulf of Thailand. There he married a local Cambodia woman in an effort to gain a Cambodian passport before moving to Phnom Penh. [78] Aside from using Cambodia as a safe-area during the Bali operation, Hambali worked to establish the new cell at the Umm al-Qura. [79] Anti-Thai riots in the capital of Phnom Penh in January 2003 may have disrupted Hambali's near-term plans of establishing a base of operations in the country as diplomatic ties were severed between the two countries for several months.

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